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INTRODUCTION
The sense of agency refers to the experience of controlling one’s own motor actions and, as a result,
external events (Pacherie, 2008; Haggard and Chambon, 2012). Surprisingly, this aspect has been
largely overlooked in the literature on apraxia, a disorder affecting skilled and volitionalmovements
(De Renzi, 1989). In this context, an outstanding issue is whether loss of agency is an ignored
dimension of apraxia—and particularly of apraxia of tool use (see below)—or whether loss of
agency and apraxia of tool use are two independent syndromes based on distinct neurocognitive
mechanisms. The goal of this Opinion article is to tackle this issue. Note that we will mainly focus
here on apraxia of tool use, namely, difficulties in selecting appropriate everyday tools and/or in
performing the mechanical action needed to complete a task. This is only one of the manifestations
of apraxia, which may also concern the production of symbolic, meaningful, or meaningless
gestures (Osiurak and Rossetti, 2017).
LOSS OF AGENCY AND APRAXIA OF TOOL USE
The rationale underlying the idea that apraxic patients could experience loss of agency
is grounded in classical, neuropsychological models of apraxia. Historically, Liepmann
(1908) proposed that tool use is supported by the generation of movement formulae (i.e.,
the ideation), which are not stored motor programs as commonly thought, but rather
images of the action intended (Goldenberg, 2003). There is then a transfer of these
movement formulae to the motor innervation. In this framework, patients who fail to
generate movement formulae are impaired to use tools. This is the classical description
of ideational apraxia: Patients do not know what to do. By contrast, a disconnection
between movement formulae and motor innervation leads to ideomotor apraxia: Patients
know what to do but not how to do it. A last aspect concerns the deficit of motor
innervation (i.e., motor apraxia initially called limb-kinetic apraxia), an aspect we will discuss
later in this paper. Although Liepmann’s model has been repeatedly updated (Geschwind,
1975; Heilman et al., 1982; Rothi et al., 1991; Cubelli et al., 2000; Buxbaum, 2001, 2017;
van Elk et al., 2014), most current, cognitive neuropsychological models are in line with
the idea that apraxia of tool use can concern not only the ideational component (i.e.,
knowing what to do), but also the ability to select the appropriate motor action (i.e.,
knowing what to do, but not how to do it). Nevertheless, contrary to Liepmann’s model,
the ideational component is not viewed as the ability to generate a visual image of
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the action intended, but as the ability to retrieve semantic
knowledge about the functional use of everyday tools (hereafter
called semantic knowledge). In addition, for Liepmann,
movement formulae directly guide the selection of appropriate
motor innervatory patterns (i.e., the gesture is reconstructed
de novo for each use; for a somewhat similar viewpoint, see
Osiurak et al., 2011)and ideomotor apraxia is a disconnection
syndrome. By contrast, for current models, people store motor
programs specifying the kinematic characteristics of movements
associated with the use of a specific tool (hereafter called
manipulation knowledge). Thus, the issue of (mis-)selection is
no longer a disconnection issue but a memory issue. Note that
manipulation knowledge can also be considered as an internal
model, helpful to control and predict the consequences of one’s
own motor actions and to compare them to actual outcomes
(Sirigu et al., 2003; Buxbaum, 2017).
In this contemporary perspective, three kinds of disorder
can be described (i.e., volition, ideation, and selection), even
if only two of them (volition and selection) are be labeled
as loss of agency (see Pazzaglia and Galli, 2014). The first
has been described as a disorder of volition: The patient has
difficulties initiating tool-use actions and exhibiting perplexity
(e.g., the patient looks hesitatingly at the tools and objects,
picks up some of them, puts them down, and so on; De
Renzi and Lucchelli, 1988). Given that semantic knowledge
(i.e., the ideational component) can be spared, this is a specific
disorder of agency: The patient being unable to initiate volitional
motor actions (see Pazzaglia and Galli, 2014). The second is
a disorder of ideation, that is, of semantic knowledge. This
is not an instance of loss of agency because the patient
cannot form a mental representation of what to do. The
third is a disorder of selection: The patient knows what
to do, but is unable to select the appropriate manipulation
knowledge (e.g., when asked to pantomime the use of a
hammer, the patient performs a first action [rotational wrist
movements], then tries to carry out another one [oscillatory
elbow movements], and so on). This is also a disorder of
agency because the interference, caused by the competition
between different degraded motor programs, weakens the
subjective perception of controlling one’s own motor actions
(see Pazzaglia and Galli, 2014).
In broad terms, loss of agency might clearly be an
ignored dimension of apraxia of tool use, and contemporary,
cognitive models might be particularly suited to develop the
study of the underlying mechanisms (Pazzaglia and Galli,
2014). Consistent with this, studies have confirmed the
presence of loss of agency in apraxic patients with unilateral
hemisphere lesions using self-generated action paradigms
(Sirigu et al., 1999, 2004). When reported in these patients,
the loss of agency concerns both hands (ipsilesional and
contralesional) and occurs independently from elementary
sensorimotor disorders (e.g., motor neglect). However, to
our opinion, the link between apraxia of tool use and
loss of agency is not as obvious as it might appear, and
recent evidence has challenged contemporary models of
apraxia.
VOLITION AND IDEATION: TWO SIDES OF
THE SAME COIN?
The so-called existence of a selective disorder of volition in
apraxia of tool use implies that some patients could have
difficulties in initiating tool-use actions without having impaired
semantic knowledge (i.e., without a disorder of ideation). This
hypothesis presupposes that semantic knowledge supports the
ideational component of tool-use actions. However, considerable
evidence has indicated that semantic knowledge—commonly
assessed with picture-matching tasks—and familiar tool use
can be impaired independently (e.g., Negri et al., 2007; Silveri
and Ciccarelli, 2009; for a review, see Osiurak and Badets,
2016). In addition, tool-use disorders generally occur in left-
brain damaged (LBD) patients presenting lesions within the left
inferior parietal lobe (IPL), whereas semantic knowledge involves
lesions within the temporal lobes. Taken together, these findings
suggest that semantic knowledge cannot be considered as the
cognitive basis for the ideation of tool-use actions, as proposed
by contemporary, cognitive models of apraxia of tool use, thereby
theoretically questioning the aforementioned hypothesis of a
disorder of volition without semantic knowledge deficits.
For Liepmann (1908), the ideational component
corresponded to the generation of an image of the intended
action. Proponents of manipulation-knowledge hypothesis have
interpreted it as the visual image of the motor action (i.e., the
so-called visuo-kinesthetic engram; e.g., Heilman et al., 1982;
Rothi et al., 1991). Nonetheless, another interpretation is that this
refers to the visual image of the mechanical action involving tools
and objects (e.g., a hammer pounding a nail), an interpretation in
line with the technical-reasoning hypothesis (Osiurak et al., 2010;
Osiurak and Heinke, 2018; for a somewhat similar viewpoint, see
Goldenberg and Hagmann, 1998; Goldenberg and Spatt, 2009).
This hypothesis posits that people reason about physical object
properties to generate a mental simulation of the mechanical
action, appropriate to solve a physical problem. This reasoning
is based on mechanical knowledge, that is, knowledge about
mechanical and physical principles (e.g., lever, cutting) that
might involve the left IPL. A key assumption is that technical
reasoning supports the use of both familiar and novel tool use,
as confirmed by neuropsychological and neuroimaging studies
(for reviews, see Osiurak and Badets, 2016; Reynaud et al., 2016).
In this view, patients with impaired technical reasoning can have
difficulties not only in initiating tool-use actions (a so-called
disorder of volition) but also in performing the appropriate
ones (a disorder of ideation). For instance, Osiurak et al. (2013)
asked LBD patients with tool-use disorders to solve mechanical
problems in using novel tools. Besides severe difficulties in
solving the problems, those patients spent a considerable time
scrutinizing and grasping tools and objects without initiating
tool-use actions, when compared to healthy participants. In
other words, those patients were unable to generate a mental
simulation of the mechanical solution, preventing them from
following any trial-and-error strategy and leading them to
perform poorly and to be perplexed. These findings suggest
that a so-called disorder of “volition” (i.e., perplexity) may
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solely be another manifestation of a disorder of ideation (i.e.,
impaired technical reasoning), but not an instance of loss of
agency as suggested earlier. Actually, disorders of “volition”
may better suit the clinical description of patients with apathy
and apragmatism following damage to the frontal dorsolateral
or anterior cingulate cortex, who demonstrate a dissociation
between normal motor functions and loss of desire to act
(e.g., Devinsky et al., 1995).
SELECTION OF MOTOR OR MECHANICAL
ACTIONS?
Selective difficulties in selecting appropriate manipulation
knowledge (i.e., a disorder of selection) could be viewed as an
instance of loss of agency: The patient knowing what to do (no
disorder of ideation), but not how to do it (see Pazzaglia and
Galli, 2014). This interpretation of patients’ difficulties works
relatively well if we consider that semantic knowledge supports
ideation. However, we have seen earlier that this assumption is
questionable. Besides, the technical-reasoning hypothesis offers
an alternative idea in suggesting that patients with apraxia of
tool use perform incorrect motor actions simply because they are
unable to generate an appropriate representation of the correct
mechanical action. In a way, the so-called disorder of selection
might be not an instance of loss of agency, strictly speaking, but
a manifestation of impaired technical reasoning (see below for
two other manifestations). Contrary to the technical-reasoning
hypothesis, themanipulation-knowledge hypothesis has not been
mainly developed from real tool-use tasks, but rather from
the pantomime production task (Buxbaum, 2017; Osiurak and
Badets, 2017), which consists of asking patients to pretend
to use a given tool. In this task, the examiner can only
assess patients’ motor actions, perhaps increasing the belief
that the difficulty is necessarily due to a deficit for selecting
the appropriate manipulation knowledge—and, as a result, a
potential instance of loss of agency. However, evidence has
shown that the demonstration by pantomime is a non-routine,
creative task that can involve a plurality of cognitive processes
(working memory, semantic memory, communicative skills,
technical reasoning; Roy and Hall, 1992; Bartolo et al., 2003;
Goldenberg et al., 2003; Baumard et al., 2014; Goldenberg,
2017; Lesourd et al., 2017; Finkel et al., 2018). This multi-
determined nature of pantomime is also confirmed by the
diversity of brain areas that can be involved in this task (left
IPL, left temporal lobe; e.g., Goldenberg and Randerath, 2015;
for review, see Niessen et al., 2014), whereas real tool use
concerns mainly the left IPL (e.g., Goldenberg and Spatt, 2009).
Besides, if demonstration by pantomime is a key task used to
observe a deficit of selection and, as a result, a loss of agency,
there should be a relatively narrow link between performance
in pantomime tasks and sense of agency. A key study in the
field did not observe such a link, showing that difficulties in
a self-generated action paradigm (supposed to assess the sense
of agency) can occur in patients with a perfect score of 100%
in a pantomime production task (Sirigu et al., 2004). Taken
together, these findings question not only the idea that the so-
called disorder of selection is an instance of loss of agency but
also, more generally, whether this deficit refers to a clinical
reality.
APRAXIA—BUT NOT OF TOOL USE—CAN
BE ACCOMPANIED BY LOSS OF AGENCY
To sum up, apraxia of tool use might not be accompanied
by loss of agency, and the so-called manifestations of loss of
agency in this syndrome might be nothing else other than the
different facets of a disorder of ideation, resulting from impaired
technical reasoning. This does not exclude the possibility that
apraxia of tool use and loss of agency occur concomitantly
because of overlap between the underlying neural substrates
(fronto-parietal networks). Nevertheless, the fact that distinct,
specific brain areas might be involved in each syndrome confirms
the independence of the two syndromes (e.g., left IPL and
particularly the supramarginal gyrus for apraxia of tool use vs.
right IPL and particularly the angular gyrus for loss of agency;
e.g., Farrer et al., 2008). Group studies with brain-damaged
patients assessed concomitantly on the two dimensions (i.e.,
apraxia of tool use and sense of agency)may be particularly useful
to test the independence vs. dependence of the two syndromes
more directly, not only at a behavioral level but also at a neural
level. Perhaps the only apraxic patients experiencing loss of
agency might be those suffering from motor apraxia or alien
hand sign after lesions within the superior frontal and/or parietal
cortex, such as in patients with corticobasal syndrome (Zadikoff
and Lang, 2005). These patients frequently and explicitly report
that their hand(s) do not do what they want, corroborating a loss
of control of their own motor actions (for evidence of loss of
agency in this syndrome, see Wolpe et al., 2014). This is perhaps
the only divergence we found with Liepmann’s conception of
apraxia of tool use, because, according to this conception, loss
of agency—the patient knows what to do but not how to do
it—is supposed to accompany ideomotor apraxia and not motor
apraxia.
That being said, another potential cause of loss of agency
may lie in body schema disorders. Indeed, patients who have
difficulties experiencing their actions as their own may also have
upstream difficulties experiencing (part of) their body as their
own, whichmight be a sufficient and perhaps more parsimonious
hypothesis in some cases. This raises issues as to the relationships
between body schema and cognition. For example, patients
suffering from either partial or global deafferentation following
spinal cord injury may demonstrate impairments in laterality
judgment tasks, not because of parietal lesions and loss of agency
but presumably because of primary loss of body awareness (Ionta
et al., 2016). Although the diagnosis of apraxia implies to rule
out sensitive and proprioceptive deficits, these latter levels—
as well as more complex sensory integration mechanisms—are
not systematically tested in studies on the sense of agency.
Previous works demonstrated a dissociation between sensory and
proprioceptive inputs on the one hand, and perception of self-
generated movements on the other hand (e.g., Sirigu et al., 1999),
yet body schema is a complex, multi-level process (Sirigu et al.,
1991; De Vignemont, 2009). Future research may disentangle the
relative contribution of action awareness and body awareness to
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the performance of apraxic patients in tasks assessing the sense of
agency.
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